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INTRODUCTION
As the income gap between the rich and the poor widens,
Americans have begun to demand reform.1 The Occupy Wall Street
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham Law School, 2013. I would especially like to thank
Professor Linda Sugin for her guidance in developing this topic, reviewing multiple
drafts of this Note, and providing thoughtful comments. I am also very grateful to the
members of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their hard work in
preparing this Note for publication.
1. See Jose Fernando Lopez, Income Distribution and the Occupy Wall Street
Movement,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
8,
2011,
7:32
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jose-fernando-lopez/cbo-munitions-to-occupyw_b_1080729.html.
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movement is a recent reflection of the public’s frustration.2 The
lowering of the effective tax rate for the very rich to 18% in 2008 from
30% in 1995 is often cited as the main cause for the income gap.3 Tax
experts, however, are aware that the drop in effective tax rates for the
very rich over the years is only the tip of the iceberg; a much larger
problem looms in the non-taxation of unrealized gains.4 Although the
very rich generate a majority of their income from the appreciation of
their assets like stocks, business interest, and real estate,5 the
appreciation of that property can only be taxed when realized under the
current law.6 Mark Zuckerberg, a co-founder and chief executive officer
of the popular social networking service Facebook, is an example of this
phenomenon.7 Some analysts estimated Mr. Zuckerberg’s stake in
Facebook to be worth as much as $28 billion before the IPO of the
company.8 Mr. Zuckerberg will not be taxed on his stake in Facebook
unless he disposes of his shares.9 If upon death, Mr. Zuckerberg
bequeaths the shares to his heirs, his heirs will only pay tax upon sale of
the stock only for the appreciation in value since Mr. Zuckerberg’s
death.10
Some call the realization rule “‘the Achilles’ heel’ of the tax
system, ‘the root of many tax evils,’ and . . . ‘the most intractable
problem in the income tax.’”11 One explanation for the rule is the belief
2.
3.

See id.
Ultrarich Are Aware of Tax Loophole on Unrealized Gains, INVESTMENTNEWS
(Dec. 4, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20111204/REG/
312049976.
4. See id. (“The 800-pound gorilla is unrealized appreciation.” (quoting Edward J.
McCaffery)).
5. Arthur B. Kennickell, Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S.,
1989 to 2007, 25–26 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf.
6. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 212 (1920).
7. See David S. Miller, Op-Ed, The Zuckerberg Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at
A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/the-zuckerbergtax.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1551
(1998) (citing William D. Andrews, The Achilles’ Heel of the Comprehensive Income
Tax, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980S, at 278, 280 (Charls
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that unrealized gains cannot be employed for “separate use and benefit”
unless realized,12 but the reality is that there are ways for the wealthy to
generate cash for consumption, completely tax-free, without ever
needing to dispose of their assets.13 For example, Mr. Zuckerberg can
simply use his stocks as collateral to borrow against, thereby avoiding
tax liability while enjoying the fruits of his enormous unrealized
wealth.14 This scenario is even more likely today, when the interest
rates for the very rich have plummeted to almost 1%.15 Mark
Zuckerberg’s ability to avoid taxes on his enormous wealth is only a
very recent example of how the very rich can take advantage of “Tax
Planning 101.”16
Thirty-five years after its first publication, William D. Andrews’
seemingly radical approach, adopting a consumption-based tax system
to solve the problem with the realization rule,17 draws renewed interest.
The proposal provides simple solutions to the efficiency and equity
problems of the realization rule without creating new complications.18
Unlike other proposals, Andrews’ forgotten approach to solving the
realization rule puzzle is simple and creates few undesirable
consequences.19 Part I of this Note explores the historical and legal
framework of the realization rule and its relation to income. In addition,
Part I discusses the equity and efficiency problems of the realization rule
and provides legal background for Andrews’ proposal. Part II of this
Note examines the numerous proposals that have emerged since the
adoption of the realization rule. Moreover, Part II uses classic tax policy
E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983); Edward D. Kleinbard & Thomas L.
Evans, The Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a Realization-Based Tax System, 75
TAXES 788, 789 (1997); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without
Realization: A “Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 728
(1992)).
12. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920).
13. See Miller, supra note 7.
14. Id.
15. See Ultrarich Are Aware of Tax Loophole on Unrealized Gains, supra note 3.
16. See Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
809, 893 (2005) (citing Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now Collect Any Revenue from
Taxing Capital Income?, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 981 (2004)) (discussing historical examples
of a wealthy person’s tax planning activities).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part III.
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analysis to explain the equity and efficiency problems of the mark-tomarket, interest-on-tax, and retrospective taxation proposals. Part III of
this Note explores Andrews’ proposal in detail and explains why
Andrews’ consumption tax system effectively solves the realization rule
problem. Part III also addresses critics’ concerns of the consumption tax
system.
I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE REALIZATION RULE PROBLEM
AND ITS RELATION TO INCOME
Section A of Part I takes a historical look at how the realization rule
became part of the definition of income. Then, Section B explores the
equity and efficiency problems that the realization rule creates. Section
C examines several of the remedial proposals that have emerged in
response to the realization rule. Finally, Section D provides historical
background for Andrews’ consumption tax proposal and explains why
Andrews’ proposal becomes relevant today.
A. THE MEANING OF INCOME
There is no universal agreement on the meaning of income.20
Economists generally view income differently from governmental
entities, and economists and experts within government disagree among
themselves.21 The result is an income tax base that is a hybrid of
economic, political, and legal concepts.22 Economists understand
income as the periodic sum of consumption and changes in savings and
investments, which follows the Haig-Simons conception of income.23
While the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “[t]o
lay and collect taxes,” it does not define income.24 The Sixteenth
Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have the
20. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50–51 (1938); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
21. Marjorie M. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of
Realization, in TAX STORIES, 93, 95 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
22. Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 930–32 (1967).
23. See SIMONS, supra note 20, at 50.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, form whatever sources
derived.”25 The Tax Code echoes the Sixteenth Amendment, defining
income as “all income from whatever source derived” and provides a
non-exclusive list of 15 sources of income.26 Section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code further defines gross income.27
In Eisner v. Macomber,28 the Supreme Court limited taxable
income to income realized and explained that income is neither a gain
accruing to capital, nor a growth or increment of value in the
investment.29 Rather, the Court concluded that income could only
consist of funds received or drawn by the taxpayers for his use, benefit,
and disposal.30 The Macomber Court not only redefined taxable income
but it also made the realization rule a constitutional requirement.31
After Macomber, the Supreme Court tried to loosen the realization
requirement by defining which events constitute realization.32 The most
significant departure from Macomber was the decision in Helvering v.
Bruun.33 In Bruun, the Court held that “separation from capital” was not
an all-inclusive definition of realization.34 Ten days later, the Court
went on to explain in Helvering v. Horst35 that realization was a rule
“founded on administrative convenience” and meant only to delay
taxation.36 The Court, however, never fully overruled Macomber’s
institution of realization as a constitutional requirement.37
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to obviate the realization rule as
a constitutional requirement, Congress has enacted several statutes that
abandon this rule. Section 1256 of the Code treats certain contracts on a
mark-to-market basis partially in order to avoid the long-standing

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
Id.
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Id. at 193.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g, United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
309 U.S. 461 (1940).
Id. at 468–69.
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
Id. at 116.
Rodney P. Mock & Jeffrey Tolin, Realization and its Evil Twin Deemed
Realization, 31 VA. TAX REV. 573, 592 (2012).
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problem of straddles.38 A straddle is a contract for futures or options
where one position is long and the other is short, and the gain in one
position is offset by loss in the other.39 Until the adoption of § 1256, it
was possible to declare the losing position in one year and the gain in
the next year.40 This would generate a deduction against other income
in the first year and that loss would be carried forward to the next year.41
Section 1256 requires that both sides of the transaction be reported on a
mark-to-market basis at year-end.42 In addition, Congress has enacted §
475, which requires dealers in securities to report their shares on a fair
market basis at the last business day of the year.43 Furthermore, lessors
and lessees are required to maintain certain payments for the use of
property or services on an accrual basis under § 467.44
B. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE REALIZATION RULE
If the federal income tax structure is designed to guarantee the
same rate of tax on all income, then the realization rule violates both
horizontal and vertical equity.45 Vertical equity is violated because
under the realization rule, it is wealthy taxpayers who mainly benefit
from the deferral of tax.46 Similarly, horizontal equity is compromised
because the same level of income from different sources is taxed
differently under the current tax system.47
The realization rule violates vertical equity because the wealthy
benefit disproportionally from this rule. Vertical equity demands higher
income taxpayers to be taxed more heavily than lower income
38.
39.

I.R.C. § 1256 (2006).
57 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS:CURRENT THROUGH 2012, at 1 (2012).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 147, 334 (7th ed. 2005).
43. I.R.C. § 475 (2006).
44. I.R.C. § 467 (2006).
45. See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L.
REV. 355, 392 (2004) (citing Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16
VA. TAX. REV. 39, 42 (1996) (noting that if efficiency were the only concern, different
rates on labor and capital income might be preferable).
46. See Kennickell, supra note 5.
47. See Schenk, supra note 45, at 393.
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taxpayers.48 Unrealized capital gains represent a larger portion of the
income of the wealthy because they can afford to hold large amounts of
capital.49 In addition, capital needs to be held for a long period of time
in order for its holder to benefit from the tax deferral, again something
that wealthy taxpayers are able to afford.50 Moreover, taking full
advantage of the realization rule requires careful tax planning that is
typically used by the wealthy.51 Finally, because wealthy taxpayers can
borrow against their unrealized gain to support their lifestyle and later
pass the gain to their heirs, they are able to avoid tax altogether.52 To
the extent that wealthy taxpayers benefit disproportionally from the tax
deferral, vertical equity is violated.
Horizontal equity requires that the tax system treat similarly
situated individuals the same.53 Similarly situated individuals for tax
purposes are those individuals who have the same levels of income
regardless of the source.54 Under the current tax system, however,
income from different sources is treated differently.55 Moreover,
accrued gains are taxed on a stepped up basis when appreciated property
is transferred to charity or held until death.56 Inequities would result
only if the tax savings are not fully capitalized into the price of the
asset.57 It is unlikely that the tax advantage of an asset is capitalized
fully into its price for many reasons, including different marginal and
effective rates, difficult entry barriers to the market, loss limitations, and
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 15, 148, 334 (7th ed. 2005).
See Schenk, supra note 45, at 393.
Id.
Id.
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Capital Taxation, 23 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 166, 175 (2006), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/
displayFulltext?type=1&fid=439801&jid=SOY&volumeId=23&issueId=02&aid=4398
00&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=#.
53. Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON
HALL L. REV. 421, 422 (2006).
54. See Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation be Taxed?: The Case
for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 92 (2011) (citing RICHARD
A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 160
(1959)).
55. See, e.g., Desco Prods. Caribbean, Inc. v. ’Virgin Islands, 511 F.2d 1157 (3d
Cir. 1975) (applying Virgin Islands law); Miles v. Dep’t of Treasury, 199 N.E. 372
(Ind. 1935); Welch v. Henry, 223 Wis. 319 (1937).
56. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2006).
57. Schenk, supra note 45, at 394.
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taxpayers who do not change their investment behavior based on tax
advantages.58 Therefore, it seems unlikely that the tax benefits of the
realization rule are fully capitalized into the price of the assets and
certain sources of income are taxed at preferential effective tax rates.59
The realization rule in its pure form results in multiple
inefficiencies.60 Further distortions are caused by government’s efforts
to correct for some of the inefficiencies.61 These inefficiencies can be
roughly divided into distortions in taxpayers’ behavior and inefficiencies
caused by the transactional cost to both the taxpayers and the
government associated with avoiding or administering the rule.62
Moreover, the realization rule causes serious revenue effects.63
1. Lock-in Effect and Loss Limitations
The realization rule creates a lock-in effect that discourages many
taxpayers from making divestment decisions purely based on whether it
would make sense to do so.64 This has been cited as a partial reason for
the lower rates on capital gains.65 However, while the alternative of
simply borrowing against unrealized gains and paying no income tax
exists, the lock-in effect will not be fully neutralized with lower rates on
capital gains because the interest charges for the very rich are only a
fraction of the reduced tax rate on capital gains.66 The amnesty given to
unrealized capital gains at death allows many taxpayers to borrow
against their realized and unrealized assets, and never pay tax.67 This is
because the Code allows taxpayers to bequest assets to their heirs at a
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 394–96.
Id.
Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 25 (1993).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id.
64. Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation,
52 TAX L. REV. 45, 50 (1998).
65. See Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 344 (1993) (“The lock-in effect describes an
investor’s reluctance to incur a tax on realization of gains . . . .”).
66. McCaffery, supra note 16, at 896.
67. McCaffery, supra note 16, at 892–93.
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step-up basis.68 As a result, the capital gain that had accumulated until
that moment is never taxed.69 A consequence of this treatment is an
exaggerated lock-in effect.70
2. Transactional Costs
Another source of inefficiency is the transaction costs associated
with using the realization rule to one’s economic advantage.71 These
costs include information costs and fees paid to lawyers or accountants
to provide information about the law and various tax planning
strategies.72 The complexity of the realization rule drives information
costs even higher,73 as well asthe complexity of legislative responses
that seek to limit the abuse of the realization rule.74 Such responses
include loss limitation rules to deter strategic trading or expense
allocation, as well as provisions designed to recover some of the benefits
of deferral.75 Lastly, the capital gains preference adds another wrinkle of
complexity.76
In order to limit the scope and abuses of the realization rule,
Congress must constantly adopt new provisions.77 Legislation is a
continuous and costly battle because often, limiting one abuse simply
shifts taxpayers’ behavior to a new scheme.78 For example, Congress
adopted § 1259 to limit an investor’s ability to benefit from economic
gain while deferring their tax obligation;79 however, § 1259 did not

68. I.R.C. § 1014 (2006); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital
Gains, 28 VA. TAX. REV. 477, 502 (2009).
69. Johnson, supra note 68, at 502.
70. Id.
71. Schenk, supra note 45, at 391.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 392.
77. See id. at 388 (citing I.R.C. § 1211 (2006) (limitations on capital losses); I.R.C.
§ 1091 (2006) (losses on wash sales); I.R.C. § 1092 (2006) (straddle rules); I.R.C. § 267
(2006) (losses on sales to related parties) I.R.C. § 163(d) (2006) (limitations on interest
deductions); I.R.C. § 469 (2006) (passive loss rules)).
78. Schenk, supra note 45, at 392.
79. Id. at 388.
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foreclose all opportunities to defer gain.80 As a result, taxpayers have
replaced a short-against-the-box transaction strategy—a short sale by
a individual with a long position in the same securities—with one
where the investor retains 25% of the risk.81 Overall, the realization rule
causes taxpayers and the government to incur substantial transaction
costs.82 Most of these transaction costs do not raise revenue.83 It is
unlikely that any tax reform will entirely eliminate transactional costs
but such costs should be a main consideration in evaluating reform
proposals.84
3. Revenue Effect
Tax deferral under the realization rule, the many ways taxpayers
are able to decrease their tax bill, and the possibility of complete tax
avoidance under the buy/borrow/die tax planning strategy, significantly
affect government’s revenue.85 By deferring tax payments under the
realize rule, the value of the tax paid will be worth less because of
inflation.86 In addition, the preferential rates for capital gains lower the
government’s revenue even further.87
II. PROPOSALS AIMING TO ADDRESS THE REALIZATION RULE
PROBLEMS
Numerous proposals have emerged in an attempt to remedy
problems that arise under the realization rule. One such proposal is a
mark-to-market system where gains and losses are taken into account
each year whether realized or not.88 Under this regime, on the last day
of the year, each unsold asset is treated as if it had been sold that day at

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
Schizer, supra note 11, at 1563.
See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).
Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based
Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 541 (2004).
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a price equal to its fair market value, and then reacquired at the same
price.89 Other proposals offer to preserve the realization rule but suggest
ways to eliminate some of the negative consequences of the realization
rule.90
The interest-on-tax deferral proposals preserve the realization
requirement by assuming that the proper time to tax is upon a realization
event.91 This proposal views the deferred tax as a loan from the
government where interest should be charged.92 In this way, the
interest-on-tax deferral proposals attempt to eliminate the deferral
benefits of the realization rule under the current system and restore
horizontal and vertical equity.93 Similar to the interest-on-tax deferral
approach, retrospective proposals also preserve the realization
requirement while stripping the deferral benefits under the current
system.94 Retrospective proposals split the ex post return of an asset
into a return to waiting and return to risk, allocate the returns over the
holding period, and impose interest on the deferred taxes at the risk-free
rate.95
Part II provides a detailed tax policy analysis of the main proposals
for reforming the realization rule. Section A analyses a mark-to-market
system, while Section B evaluates proposals that preserve the realization
rule but attempt to strip deferral tax benefits. Specifically, Section B
looks at interest-on-tax deferral proposals and retrospective taxation
proposals. Part C discusses retrospective taxation. Part D introduces
Andrews’ proposal for a consumption tax system.

89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Cynthia Blum, New Role of the Treasury: Charging Interest on Tax Deferral
Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1988); Roger Brinner, Inflation, Deferral and the
Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 570–71 (1973).
92. Schenk, supra note 88, at 541.
93. Id.
94. See Land, supra note 64, at 83, 107; Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital
Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 167 (1991); David F. Bradford, Fixing
Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731, 738 (1995).
95. Schenk, supra note 88, at 541.
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A. A MARK-TO-MARKET SYSTEM
A mark-to-market system presents a perfect world where capital
gains are taxed on a periodic basis in a manner consistent with the
taxation of other income, such as wages.96 While this approach will
solve many of the problems with the realization rule,97 a new subset of
efficiency and equity concerns emerges.98 This explains why a mark-tomarket system has not been adopted.99
A mark-to-market system presents serious liquidity concerns.100 A
system that taxes increases in net worth without regards to liquidity will
distort taxpayers’ behavior much more than one that taxes at sale when
cash is available.101 Under a mark-to-market system, tax is due at yearend regardless of whether the gain is realized and the taxpayer is able to
pay the tax.102 This will cause forced liquidations, which is especially
problematic for real estate, closely held businesses, and other nondivisible assets.103 Some commentators believe that liquidity is not a
significant concern and is not a sufficient justification for the realization
rule.104 These commentators point out that Congress currently imposes
taxes in situations where liquidity is a concern as in swaps of
properties.105 Taxpayers are also subject to tax when they are
compensated with property regardless whether they decide to sell the
property.106 Also, accrual based taxpayers have tax obligations without
receipt, and any liquidity concerns are simply considered the cost of
doing business.107
Nevertheless, these situations are deviations from the norm.
Currently, taxpayers are generally put on notice when they have to pay
96. Fred B. Brown, “Complete” Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559,
1562 (1996).
97. Id. at 1565–66.
98. Schenk, supra note 88, at 541.
99. Schenk, supra note 45, at 374.
100. Land, supra note 64, at 65.
101. Id. at 55.
102. Id. at 59.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Schenk, supra note 45, at 360.
105. Id. at 361.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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tax, which helps them factor in the cost of such tax in their decision to
engage in particular transaction.108 A mark-to-market system would not
always give taxpayers any forewarning or options to avoid the tax.109
This can be particularly problematic in situations where assets are not
easily sold.110 Even more problematic is a situation where the
taxpayer’s only asset is his home or family farm.111 While liquidity
problems alone do not justify the realization rule, the liquidity concerns
in a pure mark-to-market system will require multiple exemptions to be
carved out in order to minimize the disruptiveness of such system.112
A second frequently cited problem to a mark-to-market system is
valuation.113 An accretion tax would require that all assets are valued at
the end of the year.114 Some believe that the resulting administrative
burden is almost prohibitive.115 Others see the valuation concern as not
so easily assessed.116 Those who do not see valuation as a significant
problem cite to studies showing that the annual inventory of publicly
traded securities would not be so burdensome.117 These advocates also
point to the transfer system, real estate annual valuations, and estate
taxes as examples of valuations that are relatively stable and not as
problematic.118 Although such valuations are not always accurate,
proponents of a mark-to-market system say that an approximate
valuation might be sufficiently acceptable and therefore valuation
should not be a significant reason to reject the mark-to-market system.119

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Land, supra note 64, at 55.
Id.
Id.
Schenk, supra note 45, at 363.
Id. at 365.
DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 73 (2d ed. 1984).
114. Brown, supra note 96, at 1562.
115. Thomas L. Evans, The Evolution of Federal Income Tax Accounting-A
Growing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market?, 67 TAXES 824, 825 (1989).
116. See Schenk, supra note 45, at 366.
117. Thomas L. Evans, The Realization Doctrine After Cottage Savings, 70 TAXES
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Critics of the mark-to-market system also note that estate taxes and
property taxes under the current system are different than the scale of
valuation that will be required under a mark-to-market system.120 While
estate taxes are imposed on limited wealthy taxpayers, a mark-to-market
system will apply to a far larger segment of the population. Even those
who accept an approximation of estate taxes for the wealthy might be
unwilling to compromise to inaccurate calculations for those less welloff.121 Property taxes are also easier to calculate because they typically
apply only to real estate within a given community and track only
relative property values, and these values are unlikely to change
dramatically year to year.122
Valuation is even more complex for unique items such as jewelry,
closely held businesses, artwork, etc.123 At least one critic has
recognized that since everything can be valued, the real issue is how
much such annual valuations would cost.124 While the taxpayers will
have to bear the majority of such cost, the government will also have to
absorb some of the cost of monitoring.125 The taxpayers have little
incentive to get the valuation right, and, therefore, the government will
have to spend significant resources to monitor the correct valuation of
assets.126
Society’s deep-rooted intuition is that paper-gains are
“insufficiently authentic to be taxed.”127 That perception is grounded in
the idea that returns based on market risk are transient and taxpayers
should not be subject to payment while that market risk continues to
exist.128 Critics argue that a mark-to-market system assumes that assets
have value based on their potential to be sold when, in reality, their
value is only hypothetical without an actual sale.129 Some critics believe
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that no valuation model can assign true value to an asset because value
is not an intrinsic property of an asset.130 The income tax system
appears to be socially acceptable because it is based on ability to pay.131
Ability to pay is related both to net worth and liquidity.132
B. INTEREST-ON-TAX DEFERRAL PROPOSALS
“These proposals take the realization requirement as a given but
assume that the proper time to tax (if it were possible) is when the
income accrues.”133 Currently, the tax liability is treated as an interestfree loan from the government.134 The interest-on-tax deferral proposals
suggest that the government ought to charge a fee for these interest-free
loans.135 As such, “the investor allocates the gain or loss over the
holding period of the investment, calculates tax for each year, and
imputes the interest on the under- or overpayment of taxes;”136 however,
the proposals are problematic in terms of the correct valuation of the
interest and even liquidity.137
The main valuation problem is similar to the problem that is present
under the mark-to-market system.138 The correct amount of the “loan”
and interest cannot be calculated without determining what the
taxpayers would have owed at the end of each year.139 Because such
calculations would be prohibitively complex, most proposals involve
simplified interest calculation using the assumption that the gain grew
ratably or at some compound rate.140 Both methods of calculation are
likely to either under-tax or over-tax the taxpayer.141 Consider a
constant rate model, which would result in a larger loan later in the
period because of the effects of compounding.142 The outcome is an
130.
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overstatement of the loan in the early period, and thus, an increased
amount of interest.143 In cases where most of the gain accrued late in the
holding period, there will be a large interest charge without a matching
deferral.144 Thus, the tax will be overstated.145 Conversely, if the gain
accrued immediately after acquisition, the taxpayer will be undertaxed.146 The potential over-taxation and under-taxation will likely
cause distortions as taxpayers whose assets surged in value immediately
after acquisition will try to hold on to assets in order to take advantage
of the lower tax for deferral and those whose assets suddenly spiked in
value will look to sell those assets.147
Another valuation problem is that the use of the sale price might
not be an accurate measure of the correct amount of tax loan.148 This
will result in under-taxation.149 Another administrative problem related
to valuation is fixing the interest rates.150 It is unclear whether the
taxpayer’s or the government’s borrowing rate should be used.151 Using
the taxpayer’s rate will be problematic because of the immense
information gathering that would be required and the inequities that will
result from taxpayers with poor credit ratings having to pay the highest
interest charges.152 However, using the government’s borrowing rate is
also challenging because a rate that is different from the taxpayer’s
borrowing rate will affect the taxpayer’s borrowing decisions,
particularly for taxpayers with bad credit.153 Another problem with this
approach is that the interest rate will have to remain constant which will
cause further distortions and inaccuracies related to unequal conditions
at the time of acquisition and time of sale.154
Interest-on-tax proposals are appealing because they seem to
restore vertical and horizontal equity without causing the efficiency
143.
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148.
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problems of the accretion system.155 However, because accurate
calculation of the tax and interest will be extremely complex, simplified
accounting will result in over and under calculation of the tax.156 This
will affect horizontal equity, as similar levels of income will be taxed
differently depending on the length of the loan and the period in which
the asset increased in value.157
C. RETROSPECTIVE TAXATION
Retrospective proposals also preserve the realization requirement
while shedding the deferral benefits under the current system.158 Alan
Auerbach first developed such approach, later followed by David
Bradford and Stephen Land.159 The Auerbach and Bradford proposals
are conceptually different from Land’s proposal.160 Auerbach and
Bradford suggest a division of the ex post return into a “return to
waiting” and “return to risk,” followed by an allocation of the returns
over the holding period, and charging interest at the risk-free rate on the
deferred taxes.161 Land’s proposal is different in that it does not look at
the deferred tax as a loan from the government but as an “equity
investment by the government.”162
Because the retrospective proposals correct the effects of the
realization requirement, they promote greater horizontal and vertical
equity. The retrospective proposals aim to draw no distinction between
those investors who defer realization and those taxed on their income
annually by eliminating the effect of the deferrals.163 This approach
promotes horizontal equity.164
Moreover, since the realization
requirement mainly favors the wealthy, stripping the deferral benefits of
the realization rule, advances vertical equity.165
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 540–41.
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A main advantage of the Auerbach/Bradford proposals is that they
eliminate any incentives to defer the realization of gains, because
“taxpayers would be in the same position regardless of when disposition
takes place.”166
Like the interest-to-tax deferral proposals, the
Auerbach/Bradford proposals remove liquidity issues by preserving the
realization requirement and eliminate the timing option by levying an
interest charge.167 Valuation issues are resolved because only the sales
price is relevant.168 In addition, arbitrage problems, which arise “when
equivalent cash flows are packaged in different ways,” are eliminated by
disaggregating all investments into returns to waiting and returns to
risk.169
Critics argue that there is an opportunity to manipulate the amount of
taxes paid by using entity-shifting means,170 even though the avoidance
cost under the current system is believed to be much larger.171 Schenk
claims that the true issue with the proposal will come from its
complexity, and the difficulty in understanding the calculations and
elections that will be required.172 Taxpayers are likely to be confused
“by the possibility of being taxed on a hypothetical gain recognition date
that could occur even before the asset was acquired,” and further by the
potential mismatch between the “gain” reported and the profit the
investor would believe had occurred.173
Under Land’s proposal, the tax due at realization would equal the
pretax yield reduced by the tax rate.174 Land uses as an example a
taxpayer, T, who invests $1,000 at a pretax interest rate of 10%. If not
taxed, after 10 years the investment would grow to $2,718.175 Assuming
a tax rate of 35%, the after-tax yield for a 10-year investment would be
6.5%, or $1,916. In other words, the government should receive $802
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($2,718-$1,916). 176 Under the current system, however, the government
collects $601 because the tax rate is applied on the nominal gain of
$1,718, while the extra $201 is the tax deferral benefit. The main
benefit of Land’s method is that it resolves many of the valuation
problems of the interest-on-tax proposals.177 Under Land’s retrospective
method, the tax is not dependent on the holding period and thus the
interest charged does not depend on the holding period.178 In addition,
the timing of the appreciation is irrelevant, which solves the under/over
taxation problems of the simplified accounting under the interest-on-tax
proposals.179 Moreover, Land’s method taxes capital uniformly with no
opportunity for substitution.180 The proposal also does not present any
liquidity problems and resolves the lock-in problem and strategic
trading.181
Land argues that the taxpayer will have an incentive to get the
valuation right because an accurate valuation is in the taxpayer’s best
interest.182 Therefore, according to Land, the government can benefit
from its reliance on the taxpayer’s calculations.183 Critics argue that this
will be true only if tax and interest rates remain the same.184 If the rates
change, reliance on taxpayers’ calculations will no longer be possible.185
Moreover, even if rates do not change frequently, the valuation expense
to the taxpayers will be significant. Land argues that the calculations
only appear complex, but in reality the proposal has the potential to
eliminate much of the complexity that already exists under current
law.186 Even so, Land acknowledges that simple models would not work
well in complex situations, such as when an asset has multiple pay
offs.187 Critics believe that valuations under Land’s approach will be
more complex and required more often than under an accrual model.188
176.
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It is unclear whether the valuation expense under Land’s proposal is
going to be lower than the cost under a mark-to-market system.189
Land acknowledges that another problem with his method will be
the way it treats losses.190 In situations where a single asset is disposed
at a loss but the portfolio shows a gain, the investor will owe tax.191
Finally, the main problem will still be the complexity of the proposal.
Land’s method involves difficult formulas, the results will be sometimes
counter-intuitive, and frequent valuations will be required.192 The cost
to the taxpayer will be significant and individuals with “any kind of
investment (stick, home, IRA) would be subject to the rule.”193 This will
discourage investments in capital income, which makesit likely that the
administrative costs from adopting the proposal outweigh the increased
revenue.194
D. ANDREW’S PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
William D. Andrews’ article, published in 1974, challenges the idea
that the income tax burdens savings in an effective way.195 Andrews
saw the problems with the realization requirement early, and called it the
“Achilles heel” of the income tax system.196 Andrews believed that the
rule made the tax law too uncertain and complex.197 He recognized that
the rule needed to be fixed and believed that a consumption tax offered
an easier and more just solution.198 According to Andrews, the
consumption tax system allowed for a tax deferral on savings that
resulted from realized income, while taxing the eventual consumption of
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these savings at full, ordinary income rates.199 Andrews’ solution was a
post-paid consumption tax system, which would resolve many of the
inequities and inefficiencies related to the realization rule under the
current income tax system.200 This section examines Andrews’
proposal, and addresses critics’ concerns.
Under Andrews’ model, ordinary investments would be deducted in
the same year they were invested and proceeds from their sale will be
taxed if not reinvested at the same rate as ordinary income.201 This
treatment will be very similar to the treatment under the current system
and the realization rule.202 The difference will come from all ordinary
income being taxed at the same time as realized capital gains, when
consumed and not when earned.203 Andrews recognizes that the
treatment of assets held for both investment purpose and personal
enjoyment, such as artworks, jewelry, and personally occupied real
estate, will require for a decision to be made as to whether a deduction
will be allowed for such assets.204 For example, in an ideal consumption
tax system, a valuable painting, which is purchased for investment
purposes but is also hung on the wall for the owner’s enjoyment, should
be taxed annually because the owner consumes the enjoyment of
looking at the painting.205 At the same time, the painting was purchased
for investment purpose as well as personal enjoyment and therefore its
purchase price will be deducted from taxable income for the year.206
Even more common would be the case with owner’s occupied
residence. If a family buys a second property for investment purposes
but also uses that property for summer vacations, then that property
would be a hybrid between an investment asset and property used for
personal consumption.207 Andrews acknowledges that the decision of
how to treat such assets would not be easy but he also points to the
treatment of hybrid assets under a true-accretion type tax, which would
necessitate the annual calculation of imputed income from the
199.
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enjoyment of such property.208 Andrews notes that the problem would
exist only when hybrid assets are sold at a loss because if such assets
were sold at a gain, the tax imposed on the gain would be “taxable in
any event.”209
III. GOING TO BACK TO BASICS: FIXING THE REALIZATION RULE WITH
A CONSUMPTION TAX
Andrews’ “most sophisticated argument” for a consumption tax
system is the model’s pre-tax neutrality with respect to taxpayers’
preference for saving or spending.210 Andrews contends that the
consumption tax does not discriminate between individuals whose
present or future taste for certain goods and services is different than the
preferences of other individuals.211 Andrews’ argument is one of
horizontal equity, an argument that society in 1974 was not prepared to
understand.212 Andrews’ consumption tax system eliminates all of the
distortions caused by the realization rule under the current system and
the valuation and liquidity concerns under a mark-to-market system.213
Moreover, the added benefit of the system’s simplicity is another reason
why a consumption tax system is the most efficient way to solve the
realization rule problem.214
Tax on consumption is source-neutral and thus it does not distort
investment decisions. In other words, because investments from all
sources are taxed at the same rate and at the same time, tax
consequences will not influence investors’ investment choices.215 In
comparison, under the realization rule, tax is paid upon the triggering of
a realization event, which occurs at different times for different
investments, and thus, distorts investment decisions ex ante.216 In
addition, a consumption tax solves distortions ex post, and the lock-in
208.
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210.
211.
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effect of the realization rule is eliminated.217 That is because
divestments are taxed only if consumed.218 If the proceeds are
reinvested, there is no tax.219
Furthermore, a consumption tax system solves many of the
valuation problems under the current system.220 The treatment of
unrealized capital gains under the current income tax system is partially
justified because of the cost of appraisals under a mark-to-market
system.221 A consumption tax eliminates this costly alternative because
it does not require the appraisal of unrealized gains.222 In addition, a
consumption tax eliminates the need for special tax rates for capital
gains,223 which is sometimes justified with the lock-in effects of the
realization rule.224 A consumption tax system treats unrealized gains
and realized reinvested gains the same, and there is no need for
preferential rates.225 Moreover, the valuation problem that results from
the difficulty to separate risk-free return and market risk would
disappear.226 Under a consumption tax model, no tax would be paid in
uninflated dollars, as it would have been under mark-to-market system.
Also, old costs would no longer be subtracted from current, inflated
sales prices that currently result in miscalculations to profits.227
Liquidity issues are also solved because tax is payable only when
there is current consumption and the cash is available.228 Also, the
hardship under the current system of recognizing and paying tax in one
year on a gain accrued over many years is eliminated because only
proceeds devoted to current consumption is taxed.229 Furthermore, the
buy/borrow/die loophole230 is closed with a consumption tax system.231
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Taxpayers can no longer borrow against their unrealized gains and wait
to pass accumulated gains to their heirs at a step-up basis.232 Lastly, the
administrative and compliance cost of a whole area of the law
concerning the effect on individual investors in corporate
reorganizations is obsolete with a consumption tax system.233 Because
the exchange of securities is treated as a reinvestment, investors can take
advantage of a deduction and no tax is due until divestment.234
Similarly, no tax is imposed on compensation paid in stock or restricted
property.235 Again, the tax awaits divestment and consumption.
The current income tax system is not a perfect one, and is a hybrid
of income and consumption tax.236 The hybrid aspect of the system
leads to horizontal inequities because equal income from different
sources is not taxed equally.237 The consumption tax system eliminates
horizontal inequity because it taxes all consumption equally.238 A
consumption tax system is fairer than an income tax system because
people tend to consume at a steadier rate than they tend to earn.239 In
addition, the problem of borrowing against unrealized gains, tax-free, to
finance one’s lifestyle will disappear under a consumption tax.240
Critics may also argue that horizontal equity would be
compromised because certain investment assets have a dual investment
and consumption purpose, and the consumption component remains
untaxed.241 Andrews recognizes that certain assets cannot easily be
classified as investments or consumer goods, such as jewelry, artwork,
and owner-occupied houses.242 Andrews argues that this problem would
also exist under a true accretion-type tax where the decision of whether
to tax the imputed value from the enjoyment of such property will have
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to be made;243 however, an accretion tax system would simply estimate
and tax the market increase in value of the assets without regard for
whether the owner has derived any enjoyment from owning the assets.244
A better argument would be that tax on imputed consumption is similar
to tax on imputed income,245 such as receiving free medical services
from a family member. Andrews explains that it would be acceptable to
deduct the purchase of assets for imputed consumption as ordinary
investments because this would be the equivalent of a failure to impute
income under a true accretion-type tax.246 In addition, Andrews
proposes an alternative where “a deduction would be allowed initially
for large purchases, but the deducted amount would be returned to
income over some specified period or at some specified rate.”247 In sum,
while the treatment of unrealized gains for hybrid assets might be more
complex than the treatment of unrealized gains for ordinary investments,
horizontal equity is either not sufficiently impaired to outweigh the
benefits of a consumption tax system, or if it is, then a possible solution
exists.
The main argument against the taxation of unrealized gains under a
consumption tax model is that vertical equity is violated because the
wealthy do not necessarily consume in the same proportion to their
resources as do the poor.248 Critics argue that unrealized gains represent
wealth, and the mere possession of wealth has benefits that raise one’s
social status to a point where present consumption is not representative
of one’s standard of living.249 Thus, opponents are concerned that one’s
level of consumption cannot be the correct measure of equality.250
In order to address this criticism, supporters of the consumption tax
model, such as Edward J. McCaffery, separate the use of unrealized
243.
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gains that are not consumed into two categories: present use and
potential use of unconsumed capital.251 In terms of present use,
McCaffery addresses the possibility that unconsumed capital today
represents power today.252 Wealth may also influence an individual’s
behavior such as the ability to take risks or undertake entrepreneurial
endeavors. These examples are reminiscent of Rawls’ notion of equality
of opportunity.253 Responses suggest that the tax system may not be the
appropriate channel through which to ensure equality of opportunity and
that government regulation might be more suitable to guarantee such
rights.254
Another possibility is that unconsumed capital today hides potential
consumption tomorrow.255 Some responses against that view maintain
that “[a] taxpayer cannot use ‘her’ capital without running through the
gauntlet of the tax system.”256 In other words, a consumption tax will
eventually get to a wealthy taxpayer’s unrealized gains even if it takes
several generations to spend all of that taxpayer’s wealth. That is
because under a consumption tax system there will be no need to
transfer wealth between generations on a step-up basis as only the
consumption of that wealth would trigger taxation.257 Hence, even if a
wealthy taxpayer chooses not to spend any of his wealth or only a small
portion of it during his lifetime, under a consumption tax system, his
heirs will eventually pay a tax on the consumption of their
inheritance.258 In contrast, under the current tax model, that taxpayer’s
wealth might never be taxed because as noted earlier, a wealthy taxpayer
can simply borrow against his wealth and consume tax-free.259 Upon his
death, the value of his shares will be transferred to his heirs on a step-up
basis and the tax revenue of his unrealized gains will be lost forever.260

251.
252.
253.
254.

McCaffery, supra note 52, at 182.
Id.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73, 245 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
McCaffery, supra note 52, at 182 (“Problems with how capital is used are best
met by regulation . . . .”).
255. Id. at 182.
256. Id.
257. Miller, supra note 7.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2006).

2013]

SOLVING THE REALIZATION PROBLEM

515

The most difficult problem to overcome under a consumption tax
system would be its adoption. The debate between an income tax
system or consumption tax has remained largely academic.261 In the
political arena, the benefits of a consumption tax have been largely lost
in partisanship.262 With the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in
1913, the United States firmly committed to an income tax system
motivated by the desire to get as much out of the yield to capital.263 At
that time, a wide range of consumption tax alternatives were proposed
but policymakers rejected all of them partly on the grounds that
consumption tax represents a larger percentage of disposable income for
the poor and middle class than it does for the wealthy.264 Andrews
renewed the income versus consumption tax debate in 1974, making his
famous argument that a consumption tax promotes horizontal equity
between spenders and savers by not taxing the yield to capital.265 Alvin
Warren responded to Andrews’ article by turning the question of
fairness to vertical equity and looking at the outcomes ex post to
evaluate the fairness of the tax.266 Warren argued that since, in the end,
savers had more than spenders, it was appropriate to tax them more.267
Warren’s argument resonated with the public opinion of the time.268
Later, Andrews’ post-paid consumption tax proposal became a fullscale legislative proposal when the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax made its
way to the House floor in 1995.269 Congress rejected the proposal.270
What the public and lawmakers had ignored then was how the
realization rule affected vertical equity under an income tax.271 If
261. McCaffery, supra note 16, at 845 (“Crudely, most tax politics have come down
to a battle of liberals versus conservatives . . . .”).
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unrealized gains are never taxed even when consumed and if unrealized
gains are the upper class’ main source of income, then the income tax
system can hardly claim to preserve vertical equity.272 Andrews’ model,
on the other hand, would tax the consumption of the wealthy regardless
of whether that consumption was a result of realized gains or of a loan
secured by unrealized appreciation.273
Some of the public skepticism towards consumption tax stems from
fear that rates will go up under a consumption tax system.274 Critics of
consumption tax systems often assume that rates under a consumption
tax have to increase to meet the demand for revenue.275 This assumption
would not necessarily be true because, under a consistent post-paid
consumption tax, the base will likely increase for two reasons. First,
because the realization rule will no longer create valuation problems, the
preferential rate for capital gains can be repealed.276 Second, a
consumption tax will capture consumption from debt in the base.277
These two provisions will be able to compensate for the larger
exemption of savings under a consumption tax.
Others incorrectly believe that the adoption of a consumption tax
will be a radical change;278 however, while the concept of a consumption
tax system would be new to society, the actual implementation of the
model would not present a huge change. The reason is that we already
have a system that is a hybrid between income and consumption.279
Additionally, the actual implementation would only involve an
unlimited deduction for savings and inclusion of debt as a taxable
input,280 because of the Haig-Simons definition of income in which
consumption equals income minus savings.281
Recently, tax reform has received considerable attention from
policy makers and is frequently discussed by companies and individual
272.
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275.
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taxpayers.282 The realization rule is cited as one of the system’s most
serious problems that must be addressed through tax reform.283 All
proposals that offer solutions to the realization rule problem under an
income tax system create new complications.284 Because Andrews’ tax
proposal solves the difficulties of the realization rule with minimal need
for further adjustments to the system, it is timely and draws renewed
interest.
CONCLUSION
Andrews’ proposal of a consumption tax system has often been
cited for its ability to solve the realization rule problems in a simple and
effective way.285 Indeed, Andrews’ approach emerges after a wave of
other proposals because of its ability to remedy the equity and efficiency
problems of the realization rule without creating a new set of
difficulties.286 A consumption tax eliminates the lock-in effect of the
realization rule, the valuation and liquidity concerns of the accretion
system, preferential tax rates for capital gains, and inflation concerns.287
The result is a simple tax on consumption from all sources, which
promotes horizontal and vertical equity.288 Although political resistance
may be a serious barrier to the adoption of a consumption tax, Andrews’
proposal remains a superior solution to the realization rule problem.
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